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(pre-publication draft, published in: Journal of International Migration and Integration  vol.3, 
no.3&4, 2002, pp.363-379) 
 
This article traces the emergence of one particular genre of discourse, the genre of “new 
realism”, in the Dutch public debates on multicultural society from the early 1990s till Spring 
2002. The focus upon different “genres” implies an interest in the performative power of 
discourse, i.e. the way in which any discourse, in or by its descriptions of reality,  (co)produces 
that reality. Four distinctive characteristics of “new realism” are detected in three subsequent 
public debates, culminating in the genre of “hyper-realism”, of which the immensely successful 
and recently murdered politician Pim Fortuyn proved to be the consummate champion. 
 
Introduction 
Nowhere in Europe, it seemed, did the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon in September 2001 trigger such an eruption of public distrust against Islam as in the 
Netherlands. Optimistic views about the Dutch as a tolerant people, or about the effectiveness of 
Dutch strategies of pacification, were contradicted by the surprisingly high incidence of violent 
attacks on mosques and an increase of aggressive behaviour against individual Muslims. The 
situation was further aggravated when in February 2002 the flamboyant columnist Pim Fortuyn 
started his own election campaign after having been dismissed as the leader of the newly 
founded political party Leefbaar Nederland (Liveable Netherlands). Within months, opinion 
polls showed that Fortuyn, who made skilful use of the media to express his anti-Islamic and 
anti-immigration views, gathered an unexpectedly large following. On May 6 pollsters predicted 
that his Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) could well become the largest party in the country. On that 
same day, Fortuyn was shot dead by a radical environmentalist. In the weeks following his 
death many mourners indicated how “Pim” had “said what we were not allowed to say”: a 
formula that referred to (White autochthonous) people’s fear of foreigners “invading” the 
country and their anger at the ruling elite for not taking their concerns seriously. On election 
day, May 15, the Social-Democratic, Conservative, Liberal, and Social-Liberal parties of the 
governing “purple” coalition suffered great losses, whereas the Christian Democrats became the 
largest and the Lijst Pim Fortuyn the second largest political party in the country.  
Still, this landslide toward a more conservative right-wing government did not appear out of 
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the blue. In this article I argue how Fortuyn’s popularity can be understood in terms of the 
growing appeal of a particular genre of discourse that has become increasingly dominant in 
Dutch public debates on multicultural society, that is, the genre of new realism. Since its first 
manifestations, representatives of this genre have met with allegations that they were playing 
into the hands of the extreme right. Such moral indignation notwithstanding, elements of the 
genre have been gradually incorporated into everyday political and public discourse. Fortuyn, I 
argue, did not so much break with previous approaches to multicultural society as radicalize a 
genre of discourse that at the time of his arrival on the political scene had already gained 
considerable respectability.  
 
The Performative Power of Language 
The way the term discourse has come to be used, both by Foucault and by discourse analysts 
who have adopted his views is actually quite vague. It may refer to one particular unit of text, to 
a corpus of specific texts, or to everything that is said and written during a particular period and 
in a particular place. For Foucault, dominant discourse is constitutive of the everyday lives and 
experiences of modern individuals. We become autonomous subjects as a result of our 
submission to dominant modes of discipline and normalization. Consequently, we are not 
merely in the sovereign position of making use of our language; our language also makes use of 
us. Every sentence we utter strikes layers of meaning that may have a serious effect on the 
social-symbolic world in which we live. According to this constructivist view, language is a 
form of action with which we construct ourselves and our world (Shotter, 1993).  
 Butler (1997) has pointed out some striking similarities between such critical 
(post)structuralist views of language and speech act theory as originally elaborated by the 
British philosopher J.L. Austin. According to Butler, speech acts such as addressing or naming 
are paradigmatic for how human individuals are “subjected” through discourse. Like promising, 
naming and addressing can be seen as acts with so-called illocutionary force: in the saying a 
doing is implied. Thus in expressing a promise, I have made it, and in addressing someone, I 
have assigned him or her a place in my material-symbolic order. Butler cautions, however, that 
there is always a difference between acting and acting upon. The assessment of the actual 
performative effects of a particular utterance or discourse cannot be made independently of the 
context in which it takes place. Any speech act can turn out to be infelicitous: because it was not 
uttered in the appropriate context or because listeners somehow resisted its appeal. By 
emphasizing this potential gap between saying and doing, between discursive practice and 
discursive effect, Butler wards off the frequently voiced accusations against Foucauldian 
constructivism that it leaves no room for resistance to the ubiquitous power of discourse.  
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Nevertheless, this constructivist view about the performative power of language concedes 
that especially our public speech is neither epistemologically nor politically innocent. In the 
following analysis, I therefore focus not only on the various standpoints taken, but also on the 
different genres of discourse, that is, the various rhetorical strategies that are used to convince 
readers of the validity of these standpoints. In doing so I trace the emergence of one particular 
genre of discourse, the genre of new realism, as it gradually gained the upper hand over other 
genres of discourse. The reason that I characterize new realism as a genre is because I focus on 
its performative effects, that is, not so much on how it describes reality as on how it 
(co)produces reality. I look at what came to be known as the national minorities debate (1991), 
the multicultural drama debate (2000), and the El-Moumni case (2001) in order to show how in 
these debates a particular genre of discourse emerged of which in 2002 Pim Fortuyn proved to 
be the consummate champion. In order to better understand what was at stake in each of these 
debates, I start by supplying some relevant background information about recent Dutch political 
history and culture.  
 
Dutch Political Culture and Governmental Policy  
After World War II, the first migration flow consisted of inhabitants of the former Netherlands 
East Indies, who arrived after the independence of Indonesia in 1949. During the 1950s and 
1960s, they were joined by guest workers from Spain, Greece, Portugal, Yugoslavia, Morocco, 
and Turkey. Later the prospect of Surinamese independence (1975) and the expiry of an 
immigration treaty between the two countries (1980) triggered a large-scale process of 
migration from Surinam. During this period (1975-1980), the yearly number of newcomers 
reached a first culmination point, also as a result of family reunifications of Turkish and 
Moroccan workers. The marriages of young Turkish and Moroccan men and women to a partner 
from their country of origin further intensified this process. Finally, since the mid-1980s the 
number of refugees and asylum seekers from non-Western countries has increased dramatically. 
Thus by 2002, about 20% of the Dutch population were of non-native Dutch descent (the usual 
term allochthones has become increasingly contested), 10% of whom belong to the so-called 
ethnic minority groups, that is, migrants and asylum seekers of non-Western descent (CBS, 
2002).  
During the 1970s, Dutch government policy regarding ethnic minority groups was aimed at 
“integration with maintenance of identity.” Initially, this approach was motivated by the 
assumption that most guest workers would eventually return to their country of origin. 
However, as this assumption proved increasingly unrealistic, it was seen to fit the well-tried 
Dutch way of accommodating differences, that is, through the structures of institutionalized 
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“pillarization.” The right to organize oneself publicly in order to maintain one's religion was laid 
down in the 1917 Dutch constitution. Since then, Dutch consociational democracy has been 
firmly established on the four religious-ideological pillars of Calvinism, Catholicism, Socialism, 
and Liberalism. Since the 1990s migrant communities have started to make active use of the 
constitutional rights of consociational society, for example, by founding Hindu and Muslim 
schools. Since 1985, moreover, migrants legally resident in the Netherlands for five years or 
more have acquired the active and passive right to vote in municipal elections.  
 By the end of the 1980s, however, the government had discarded the perspective of 
collective rights and care in order to put more emphasis on individual responsibilities and 
obligations. This was inspired by a change in political outlook, but also compelled by a long-
term economic recession. Cutbacks in social welfare could no longer be avoided. Initiated by 
governments containing Christian Democrats and Conservative Liberals, this reorientation has 
been further extended by the new coalition between Social Democrats, Conservative Liberals, 
and Social Liberals since 1994. The two consecutive purple cabinets also gave new impetus to 
the process of liberalization with the legalization of euthanasia, homosexual marriage, and 
prostitution. On the other hand, the welfare state was further dismantled by the decentralization 
of government, the privatization of state-owned companies, and stricter policies with regard to 
asylum seekers and illegal immigrants.  
 
The National Minorities Debate: The Breakthrough of New Realism 
At the beginning of the 1990s, political parties had gradually developed consensus about the 
need to give priority to socio-economic integration of immigrants over the maintenance of 
cultural and religious identity (Fermin, 1997). Still, in 1991, Bolkestein (1991a), then leader of 
the Conservative Liberals, caused quite a stir when he proclaimed that “the integration of 
minorities should be handled with guts” thus launching what came to be known as the national 
minorities debate. Bolkestein’s intervention involved a determined defence of the achievements 
of European civilization such as the universal values of secularization, freedom of speech, and 
the principle of nondiscrimination against “the world of Islam” in which these values did not 
flourish. It should be made crystal clear to Muslims living in the Netherlands that any kind of 
bargaining about the principles of Western liberalism was out of the question.  
With his intervention Bolkestein challenged the dominant Dutch discourse, which defined 
ethnic minorities as groups who occupied a marginal socioeconomic position and were in need 
of support. Social scientists were hired in large numbers by government bodies to investigate 
the problematics of different ethnic (sub)groups. In this genre of discourse, that of the 
(scientific) report, one attempted to sketch a truthful image of the social position, lifestyle, and 
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views of the object of research. Truthful, however, did not imply neutral. Especially the authors 
of qualitative, small-scale studies wrote basically sympathetic accounts that not only made 
readers know “from the outside,” but also made them understand “from the inside” which 
particular obstacles and problems people had to deal with. Most studies concluded with a list of 
recommendations about how to further the emancipation of that particular group in Dutch 
society (Prins, 1997, 2003).  
Bolkestein’s argument was not so much focused on the goal of emancipation itself as on 
how it could be reached. In its eagerness to help, the attitude of the government had become too 
lenient and permissive. Bolkestein’s supporters spoke about “hugging to death,” “treading on 
eggs,” or a “culture of pitifulness.” In their view, this urge to help ethnic minority groups 
emancipate themselves had made them more rather than less dependent on the welfare state, 
allowing them to withdraw into their own group rather than try to integrate into the larger 
society.  
Such statements are typical for a newly emerging genre of public discourse, that of new 
realism. This genre has four distinct features. First, the author presents himself or herself as 
someone who dares face the facts, who speaks frankly about “truths” that the dominant 
discourse has supposedly covered up. Thus Bolkestein (1991a) spoke firmly about the “guts” 
and “creativity” needed to solve the problem of integration and how this would leave no room 
for “compromise,” “taboos,” or “disengagement.” His supporters accordingly praised him for 
his show of "civic courage," for the "mature," "civilized," and "plain" way he had placed this 
thorny issue on the political agenda. Second, a new realist sets himself up as the spokesperson 
of the ordinary people, that is, the autochthonous population. Thus Bolkestein observed that 
“below the surface a widespread informal national debate, which was not held in public, was 
already going on” (Bolkestein et al., 1992) and that “the issue of minorities is a problem 
incessantly discussed in the pub and in the church” (Bolkestein, 1991b). Why listen to the vox 
populi? On the one hand, Bolkestein implied that ordinary people deserved to be represented 
because they were realists par excellence: they knew from day-to-day experience what was 
really going on, especially in the poor neighbourhoods of big cities and were not blinded by 
politically correct ideas: “Voters find that politicians do not take sufficient notice of their 
problems” (Bolkestein, 1991b). On the other hand, one should take the complaints of the 
ordinary people seriously in order to keep their emotions under control and channel them in the 
right direction: “Someone who ignores the anxiety, nourishes the resentment he intends to 
combat” (Bolkestein, 1992).  
A third characteristic of new realism is the suggestion that realism is a characteristic feature 
of national Dutch identity: being Dutch equals being frank, straightforward, and realistic. This is 
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particularly manifest in the publications of another new realist, the prominent journalist Vuijsje 
(1986). In Murdered Innocence. Ethnic Difference as a Dutch Taboo, he elaborated the view 
that, after World War II, the Dutch had collectively developed a guilty conscience about the fate 
of the Dutch Jews, the majority of whom did not survive the holocaust. Ever since, the Dutch 
had become overcautious: wary of being accused of racism whenever they treated people 
differently because of their ethnicity. Vuijsje testified to his desire to return to an authentic 
Dutchness, to the pre-war days when, as he supposed, “our country distinguished itself for its 
preeminently matter-of-fact like treatment of ethnic difference” (p. 7).  
 A fourth and final feature of new realism is its resistance to the left. New realists find it is 
high time to break the power of the progressive elite that dominates the public realm with its 
politically correct sensibilities regarding fascism, racism, and intolerance. This supposedly left-
wing censorship of public discourse is also criticized because it is accompanied by a highly 
relativistic approach to the value of different cultures.  
Bolkestein was the first to truly mobilize Dutch public opinion on the issue of ethnic 
minorities. Still, even his sharpest opponent agreed that liberal principles should not to be 
relinquished and that cultural relativism was indeed an untenable position. Few also disagreed 
with his proposals for the direction of minorities policy (as indicated above, the Dutch 
minorities policy had already switched its focus to integration). However, many took issue with 
the style and manner in which Bolkestein had voiced his opinion, playing on a simplified 
hierarchical opposition between us, the representatives of Western civilization, and them, those 
belonging to the world of Islam, which overlooked the injustices and evil perpetrated in the 
name of the former while ignoring the actual diversity within the latter. For some this tended to 
turn modern Dutch citizens into the subjects of discourse, talking among themselves about how 
to handle them, while reducing Muslims to the status of objects of discourse. Others criticized 
the arousal of public sentiment that might result from this eagerness to break taboos and talk 
straight (Rabbae, 1991; Bagci, 1991). In these responses the claim by new realists that they took 
an objective and value-free standpoint vis-à-vis reality was dismissed; instead they were called 
to account for the potentially detrimental effects their standpoint would have on that same 
reality. In doing so, the opponents of new realism implicitly subscribed to a constructivist view 
of language.  
 
A Multicultural Drama: New Realism With a Social Face 
Since the national minorities debate, the position of allochthones remained a recurrent issue in 
political and public debates, focusing, for example, on the emergence of so-called “black” 
schools (i.e., schools with more than 50% of students from ethnic minorities) and Muslim 
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schools, the ongoing “flood” of immigrants and refugees, and the questionable role of Islam.  
 In response to growing concerns about the lack of integration of allochthones, in 1998 a 
new ministry was established, the Ministry for Metropolitan Affairs and Integration (Grote 
Steden- en Integratiebeleid). In his first White Paper, Minister Roger van Boxtel (1998) 
sketched the outlines of a policy finely balanced between taking care of people and urging them 
to take their own initiative. At the same time he declared the Netherlands to be an immigration 
country and a multicultural society. Many new initiatives were taken to improve the situation of 
ethnic minorities, one of which was a compulsory settlement program for newcomers from 
outside the European Union.  
In spite of such efforts, in January 2000 publicist Scheffer castigated the Dutch for closing 
their eyes to the multicultural drama that was developing right before their eyes. Although rates 
of unemployment, criminality, and school drop-out among ethnic minorities were extremely 
high, the Dutch mistakenly held onto their good old strategies of peaceful coexistence through 
deliberation and compromise. In doing so they ignored the fundamental differences between the 
new situation and the earlier days of pillarized society. Presently, Scheffer argued, there existed 
fewer sources of solidarity, while Islam, with its refusal to accept the separation of church and 
state, could not be compared to modernized Christianity; finally, allochthone youngsters were 
accumulating feelings of frustration and resentment. Teaching Dutch language, culture, and 
history should be taken much more seriously. Only then would allochthone residents acquire a 
clear view of the basic values of Dutch society.  
Scheffer’s (2000) essay became the intellectual talk of the town. Like Bolkestein’s 
intervention it was welcomed because of the courageous way it challenged the view of the 
dominant elite, which, these critics suggested, had stubbornly refused to face the serious 
problems of a multicultural society. Scheffer accused politicians of “looking the other way,” 
causing “a whole nation to lose sight of reality.” In this fashion the rhetoric of Scheffer’s article 
perfectly complied with the genre of new realism. Here again was someone who dared to break 
taboos. As had happened a decade earlier, several commentators were pleased that it was finally 
possible to have a “frank” and “candid” conversation without “politically correct reflexes” 
taking the upper hand (Soetenhorst, 2000). Scheffer too claimed that what happened to ordinary 
people, the stories told “below the surface,” remained unseen and unheard, although his 
reference was not to the autochthonous population, but to the feelings of anger and frustration 
among allochthone youngsters. Yet Scheffer showed a similar ambivalence as to why these 
feelings should be taken seriously: on the one hand, these youngsters were frustrated for a 
legitimate reason, that is, for remaining stuck at the bottom of the social ladder; on the other, 
government should do more to prevent these frustrations from turning into social upheaval. Like 
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Vuijsje (1985), Scheffer also recommended the affirmation of Dutch identity as an important 
remedy for the problems of multicultural society, although his ideal Dutchman was not the 
romanticized “ordinary” man or woman in the street, but the decent and politically 
knowledgeable citizen who was finely aware of the good and bad sides of Dutch identity.  
Nevertheless, Scheffer shared with his predecessors an impatience with the cultural 
relativism of the progressive elite, which in his view had developed into an attitude of moral 
indifference. Resisting the growing leniency and laxity in the execution of laws and regulations, 
the typically Dutch culture of toleration (gedogen), Scheffer emphasized that it was high time to 
draw clear lines on what people were and were not allowed to do. What irritated him was not so 
much the toleration of anti-Western values and practices (although this surely should be tackled 
too), but the incomprehensible indifference of the left to the ever-widening gap between a 
(mostly autochthonous) majority of the well off and a (mostly allochthone) minority that 
remained stuck in a situation of deprivation. Scheffer’s version of new realism, in other words, 
was more politically correct than that of his predecessors: a new realism with a social face. 
In the responses to Scheffer’s (2000) essay, however, this socially engaged part of the 
message went almost wholly unnoticed. Most commentators welcomed Scheffer’s intervention 
for the “tougher” demands he made as a justified criticism of multiculturalism and a plea for 
assimilation (Schnabel, 2000; Bodegraven, 2000; Van den Brink, 2000). Others saw it as a 
confirmation that immigrants had been “hugged to death.” While ignoring that Scheffer had 
actually called for the opposite, they claimed that well-intended measures had merely produced 
dependent and passive clients of an overcaring welfare system (Pinto, 2000; Van Veen, 2000). 
Finally, many appreciated Scheffer’s essay as an opportunity to ring the alarm bells once again 
on what they considered to be the true drama: the influx of too many immigrants (Van Loenen 
2000; Vink 2001; Van der List, 2000).  
Next to these supporters, many also challenged Scheffer’s account. While the discourse of 
new realism whipped up the sense of drama, some of its critics attempted to calm these feelings: 
a strategy that can be seen as typical for the genre of the report. Thus readers were assured that 
things were not as bad as they looked, and that, however slowly, progress was being made: it 
only required patience (Vermeulen & Penninx, 2000; Penninx, 2000; Van Boxtel, 2000).  
  Other critics sympathized with Scheffer’s lack of patience. He had been right to speak 
about a drama, but he was mistaken about what caused it. For ethnic minorities were not so 
much held back by their lack of knowledge of Dutch ways of life as by their socioeconomic 
position. Problems were class- rather than culture-related. The social issue to which Scheffer 
had referred in the past tense had not really disappeared: it had merely acquired a colour 
(Hilhorst, 2000; Halsema, 2000; Aboutaleb, 2000). These texts resonated a critical genre of 
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discourse that in the 1990s had already lost much of its appeal, that is, the genre of 
denunciation. In its heyday this genre of discourse had revealed the shameless exploitation of 
and discrimination against foreign guest workers by capitalist industries, hoping to mobilize 
(autochthonous) readers to show solidarity and engage in political action (Prins, 1997, 2003).  
 Other critics claimed that the real causes of socioeconomic inequality could be found in 
mechanisms of racism and discrimination. Here we recognize some of the characteristic features 
of a third critical genre, that of empowerment. In this genre ethnic minorities figure as the 
victims of racial marginalization. Although texts in this genre are often interlaced with 
denunciatory remarks about Whites, they ultimately wish to inspire and empower members of 
ethnic minority groups. They do so by offering them stories of successful migrants and Blacks 
who, due to their political engagement and personal strength, actively contributed to the 
transformation of Dutch society from a mono- into a truly multicultural society. Whereas in the 
genre of denunciation (political) solidarity is the most prominent value, authors in the genre of 
empowerment aim for (cultural) diversity (Prins, 1997, 2003). Still, in the Scheffer debate the 
accusatory tone was prominent. It was, for example, suggested that the White establishment 
acted out of fear of losing its privileged position (Nimako & Willemsen, 2000) or that 
Scheffer’s emphasis on cultural differences could be perceived as a form of everyday racism (El 
Madkouri, 2000).  
 Finally, there were voices that countered Scheffer’s anticipation of an imminent drama 
with a staunch belief in the ideal of multicultural society. The opportunity to maintain one’s 
own culture, it was held, would strengthen and empower people rather than hold them back. The 
argument was shored up by pointing to apparent analogies with the Dutch tradition of 
pillarization and the strategies of new social movements. Some stated that the idea of 
pillarization should be cherished precisely because it offered new minority groups the best 
opportunity for emancipation, as it previously had for the Catholics and the Dutch-Reformed. 
Others (rhetorically) wondered why especially liberals and social democrats were so wary of 
collective identity formation. As it was phrased in the language of pillarization, did the women's 
or the gay movement not also go through a necessary stage of “strengthening within one's own 
circle” (Duyvendak, 2001)? Several allochthone spokespersons similarly happily adopted the 
language of pillarization. The director of the Dutch branch of the Islamic Turkish movement 
Milli Görüs, for example, praised the Netherlands for being “a more Islamic country than my 
country of birth, Turkey” (Karacaer, 2000). Thus leftist adherents to the strategy of collective 
empowerment gradually associated with the typically confessional-Dutch tradition of 
pillarization (Fermin, 1997).  
 
 9
The El Moumni Case: The Proliferation of New Realism  
Scheffer’s wish for openness and, if needed, confrontation was complied with quickly and in an 
unforeseen way. On May 4, 2001, the television news program NOVA dedicated an item to the 
attitude of Dutch Muslims toward homosexuality. Young Moroccan men were shown bragging 
about their manhood and venting their disdain for homosexuals. One of the more prominent 
Islamic spokespersons interviewed was Khalil el Moumni, Imam of the An-Nasr mosque in 
Rotterdam. His statements were unequivocal: homosexuality was a contagious disease; if it 
spread among Dutch youth, it would mean the end of the Netherlands, for “if men marry men 
and women marry women, who will take care of procreation?”  
Journalists were quick to find other imams willing to side with El Moumni (Lange, 2001a). 
Public indignation followed instantly, and with it the next episode in the Dutch debate, which 
came to be known as the El-Moumni case. The significant difference from earlier debates was 
that whereas previously the “clash of cultures” was talked about as happening “below the 
surface,” the El Moumni case brought that clash out into the open, into the public realm itself.  
On this verbal battlefield the genres of denunciation and empowerment did not fare very 
well. There were still those who regretted the stigmatizing effects of this bad publicity for Islam 
(Nahas, in Benbrahim, 2001). But these views were pushed to the margins by the much stronger 
voices of new realism. At the same time different versions of the genre proliferated. 
Prime Minister Kok declared that El-Moumni’s statements were highly offensive and 
intolerable. Minister Van Boxtel similarly made it clear that El Moumni had crossed the line. 
Both therefore adopted the tough talk demanded by the new realists. But the familiar Dutch 
strategy of deliberation and pacification was not discarded. Shortly after the uproar started, Van 
Boxtel, emphasizing the need for dialogue, organized a meeting with a delegation of Dutch 
Muslims including El-Moumni himself. Thus the government adopted Scheffer’s style of new 
realism with a social face, as did Christian Democrat, Progressive Liberal, and GreenLeft 
representatives in Parliament, who rejected the imam’s words while emphasizing that imams 
should be required to take a settlement course in order to learn Dutch values and the Dutch 
language. No wonder Scheffer (2001) expressed his contentment: a conflict like this should be 
fought in the public realm, not avoided by bringing it to court.  
Many, however, opted for a tougher approach. Several individuals and organizations filed 
official complaints against the imam, asking for El Moumni to be convicted on the grounds of 
discrimination. Some even wanted him deported. On a web site opened by the Gay Newspaper 
(Gaykrant), 91% agreed that “New Dutchmen should tolerate our tolerance, otherwise they 
don’t belong here” (Trouw, 2001a). In Parliament, Conservative Liberals and Social Democrats 
took a similar stand. Some opinion makers even announced that Islam was the new enemy, 
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explaining that “war” was inevitable (Sinnema, 2001a) and that Dutchmen and Muslims were 
one day likely to “bash each other’s head in” (Lazrak, in Sinnema, 2001b). For Vuijsje, the El-
Moumni case signified a “milestone in frankness”: unlike 10 years ago when political 
correctness still prevailed, the Dutch “are no longer afraid to say what they think, and people are 
once again prepared to act“ (Wagendorp, 2001).  
Finally, the El Moumni case offered the opportunity for a new and more radical version of 
new realism to emerge. The remarkable thing about this was that it was practised by both parties 
in the conflict. On the one hand, the prerogative of frankness was used to insult and provoke El 
Moumni. Van Gogh (2001), well-known enfant terrible of the Dutch media, talked carelessly of 
Muslims as “goatfuckers” and imams as “pygmies,” whereas French-Dutch columnist 
Ephimenco (2001) showed no qualms about typifying Islam as “a disease” that “infects the 
mind and distorts reality.” Both defended their blunt talk by referring to freedom of speech as 
the highest value. Thus alluding to the famous words of Voltaire against the detested Catholic 
clergy, Ephimenco assured the imam that he would passionately resist any attempt to prevent 
him from freely uttering his cocktail of “backward concepts, prohibitions and taboos.” Theirs 
was a secular, individualistic defence of new realism.  
On the other hand, El Moumni and his adherents defended their right to qualify 
homosexuality as a disease and about Europeans as standing “lower than dogs or pigs,” as El-
Moumni allegedly said in one of his sermons (Botje & Lazrak, 2001). Ironically, though, while 
defending such anti-Western views they invoked the Western values of freedom of religion and 
the separation of church and state. Like their secular counterparts they did so in a strikingly 
blunt manner. Thus one imam argued: “We live in a free country. What others do, is up to 
them,” and another: “I don´t need to do anything. Go and mind your own business” (Lange, 
2001a; Lange 2001b). El Moumni (2001) himself was similarly outspoken: “I do not need to 
justify myself to you [Minister Van Boxtel, bp] with regard to the content of my sermons,” and 
young Muslims assembled some 20,000 signatures to express their anger with the Minister’s 
“interference with religious matters” (Trouw, 2001b). Thus although their frame of reference 
was religious pillarization rather than the motto of the enlightened philosopher Voltaire, Dutch 
fundamentalist Muslims agreed with their utterly heretical enemies that they had every right to 
say what they wanted without being in any way accountable for the effects their words might 
have on others or on society as a whole. Both, as Van Gogh (2001) phrased it, “shrugged their 
shoulders in murderous indifference.” In April 2002, when El Moumni appeared in court, he 
was vindicated: the judge ruled that the imam had merely expressed his religious beliefs and 
acquitted him of all charges of discrimination.  
 
 11
Pim Fortuyn and the Turn to Hyperrealism  
In the atmosphere of crisis following September 11, Pim Fortuyn suddenly entered the political 
scene as the elected political leader of Leefbaar Nederland. An ex-Marxist sociologist, Fortuyn 
had left his job at the university to start a consultancy in "political strategic decision-making." 
Starting in 1994, in weekly columns of the liberal-conservative magazine Elsevier, he expressed 
his aversion for, among other things, the welfare state, European unification, Islam, the policy 
of gedogen (toleration), the “left church,” and the continual influx of immigrants and asylum 
seekers (Fortuyn, 2001a).  
Fortuyn’s rhetoric showed all the characteristics of the genre of new realism. On one 
occasion his face was pictured on the cover of a magazine gagged with his necktie, 
accompanied by the caption: “Are you allowed to say everything you think? Dutch taboos” (De 
Jong, 2000). And notwithstanding his aristocratic manners and appearance, Fortuyn prided 
himself on knowing what was going on in the poor neighbourhoods and fully understanding the 
concerns of ordinary people. Like the new realists before him, Fortuyn’s attitude toward his 
constituency remained ambiguous. On the one hand, the ordinary Dutchman was a new realist 
like himself. If people living on welfare illegally took jobs in the black market, their choice was 
entirely understandable, for “The poor are not at all the pitiful people the left church wants them 
to be. Most of them are just like us: emancipated, individualized, independent citizens” 
(Fortuyn, 2001a, p. 105). On the other hand, the Dutch people were in need of a true leader, 
someone like himself who could act both as their father and mother: “the father as the one who 
lays down the law, the mother as the binding element of the herd” (Het fenomeen, 2002, p. 40). 
The third element of new realism, the affirmation of national identity, was shown both in 
Fortuyn’s insistence on the preservation of national sovereignty against the ever-expanding 
influence of the EU and in his warnings about the imminent “Islamization” of Dutch society 
(Fortuyn, 2001b). Finally, his contempt for the progressive elite pervaded almost every aspect of 
his writings, resulting in his last book in which he “wiped the floor” with the purple 
governments (Fortuyn, 2002).  
 But Fortuyn also further radicalized the new realist discourse. In the wake of the debates 
on El Moumni, he took the same stand as Van Gogh and Ephimenco: freedom of opinion, even 
for an imam who deemed homosexuals like himself lower than pigs, was more important than 
legal protection against discrimination. According to the notorious interview that cost him his 
leadership of Leefbaar Nederland, the Netherlands was a "full country," Islam “a backward 
culture”, and it would be better to abolish “that weird article of the constitution: thou shalt not 
discriminate” (Het fenomeen, 2002, pp. 61, 63). He said that people could rely on him because 
he was “a man who says what he thinks and does what he says.” In other words, people were 
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asked to put their trust in Fortuyn more on account of his new realism than on the basis of his 
actual political program. And so they did, as was evident in the massive outburst of grief and 
anger following his murder and at his funeral. Without doubt one of the main ingredients of 
Fortuyn's attractiveness had been his “frank” speech on immigrants. Fortuyn's particular style, 
an odd mixture of aristocratic appearance and tough talk, was his strongest political weapon. In 
his performance of new realism, having the courage to speak freely about problems and how 
they should be solved, was turned into simply expressing yourself, that is, giving vent to your 
feelings. Fortuyn thus managed to turn new realism into its opposite, into a kind of 
hyperrealism. Frankness was no longer practised for the sake of truth, but for its own sake. 
References to reality and the facts had become mere indicators of the strong personality of the 
speaker, proof that a “real leader” had entered the stage. 
 
Conclusion: Tough Times Ahead  
The murder of Fortuyn dealt a huge blow to all those who had defended the ideal of 
multiculturalism. First, thanks to the immense electoral victory of the Christian Democrats and 
the LPF, the Netherlands in 2002 was ruled by a conservative-right cabinet (presided by the 
Christian Democrat Balkenende) that implemented stricter policies on asylum seekers, 
immigrants, and settlement demands than ever before. Second, at the level of public debate, the 
left was blamed for Fortuyn’s murder. And although his adherents had always scolded the 
politically correct establishment for their impediment of free speech, they now accused left-
wing politicians and the progressive press of having demonized Fortuyn. Combined with death 
threats and juridical charges, this resulted in an unprecedented atmosphere of (self-)censorship. 
During the months following May 6, arguments in favour of multiculturalism were considered 
politically incorrect, and many critics of Fortuyn’s views found themselves literally stunned into 
speechlessness. In the somewhat longer run, however, most of them recovered their voice. 
Simultaneously, not a single follower of Fortuyn managed to come near to his level of 
hyperrealism. A series of blunders by and conflicts among LPF politicians caused the party’s 
popularity to drop rapidly and the newly installed cabinet of Christian Democrats, Conservative 
Liberals, and LPF to fall after only 87 days in office. The elections of January 2003 reduced the 
LPF from 26 to 8 seats in Parliament. Although the Social Democrats celebrated a big victory, 
in the end the Dutch government was formed by a coalition of Christian Democrats, 
Conservative Liberals and Social Liberals (‘Balkenende II’), which is continuing on the same 
line as its predecessor. The Dutch attitude toward non-Western immigrants and asylum seekers 
seems to have changed dramatically and for good: since May 2002 in the media 
multiculturalism is self-evidently taken as a hopelessly outmoded and politically disastrous 
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ideology, and firm talk about the need to reanimate “norms and values” drowns out voices that 
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